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It has been frequently observed that the proper solution of many
tax problems requires the application of economic and accounting
principles as well as rules of law.1 The use of such "non-legal" materials
is particularly important when dealing with income tax questions 2
Any statute which attempts to tax virtually every form of gain neces-
sarily includes within the scope of its operation dissimilar businesses,
trades, professions, and transactions having widely different margins of
profit. Unless the burden of the tax is to be distributed in a capricious
and arbitrary fashion these differences must be taken into account; the
varied types of private revenue must be analyzed and the income care-
fully estimated and apportioned to the proper assessment period.3 If
this is not done, members of the same income group will be compelled
to pay greatly disproportionate amounts to the government exacting
the tax. From the viewpoint of equitable taxation it is imperative that
the statute contain an accurate concept of income and a feasible
means of ascertaining i0
In an effort to reach a tax base appropriate for these heterogeneous
sources of revenue the federal act starts with the taxpayer's gross in-
come.5 Since persons with the same gross income may have entirely
different net incomes the injustice of a steeply graduated tax on the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law.
"For example, see Magill and Maguire, Cases on Taxation (3rd ed. 194o) v; Gris-
wold, Cases and Materials on Federal Taxation (1940) vi; Brown, Book Review
(1941) go U. of Pa. L. Rev..238, 241.
2See Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 19, 20; Haig, The Concept of Income in Haig,
The Federal Income Tax (19l2) 3.
'In general, see Simonds, Personal Income Taxation (1938) 42 et seq.
"'The problem of income taxation is in essence the problem of finding norms
which will be useful as measures of the "respective abilities" of the "diverse" tax-
payers who constitute contemporary economic society." Wueller, Concepts of Tax-
able Income II: The American Contribution (1938) 53 Pal. Sci. Q. 557,580.
6'nt. Rev. Code § 22.
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former amount is apparent; consequently Congress has provided for
a number of d~ductions which are allowed when computing the
amount subject to the tax. 6 Although this remainder is designated as
"net income,"'r it is evident that the appropriateness of the designation
is determined by the exactness with which these deductions permit the
reflection of the taxpayer's actual gain for the year. Inasmuch as the
practical importance of such items as "business expense," "interest,"
"taxes," and "depreciation" will vary tremendously among the several
taxpayers, an inadequate allowance for a particular expense will im-
pose an indiscriminate burden upon those adversely affected thereby
while an excessive deduction, in addition to depriving the federal
government of revenue, relieves others of their fair share of the tax.
Among the many problems which arise in attempting to discover
an equitable tax base, one of the most troublesome is that relating to
the proper treatment of payments made by the taxpayer which are
used for the support of the federal, state, and local governments. These
payments may be made for a number of reasons and they may take a
variety of forms. For example, in addition to the customary exactions
of the tax collector, kindly disposed and appreciative citizens occasion-
ally make voluntary contributions to the public treasury. Goods and
services are frequently purchased from publicly owned enterprises
which may be operated either as a monopoly or in competition with
private business. The value of benefits received from public improve-
ments and the cost of administrative action may be collected from the
person whose property, business, or activity is directly affected thereby.
Delinquents may be compelled to pay sums of money by way of
punishment. These and similar payments help finance the activities of
government. With the many possibilities of combination and over-
lapping, such exactions are variously described and are frequently
misdescribed by taxpayers, courts, and legislatures.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that the immediate
payer of the exaction is not the person, in many cases, who actually
bears the burden of the "contribution" to the government. Such pay-
ments are frequently shifted. This shifting may be either forward or
backward and the amount may be highly conjectural or easily dis-
OInt. Rev. Code § 23. The subsections are as follows: (a) Expenses; (b) Interest;
(c-d) Taxes; (e-j) Losses; (k) Bad Debts; (1-n) Depreciation and Depletion; (o, q) Con-
tributions; (p) Pension Trusts; (r) Dividends Paid by Certain Banking Corporations;
(s) Net Operating Loss.
'Int. Rev. Code § 21 (a) Definition--"Net income" means the gross income com-
puted under section 22, less the deductions allowed by section 23.
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cernible. In addition, many payments, both direct and indirect, are
in the nature of personal expenditures while others are closely related
to the taxpayer's trade or business--and the payments in the latter
category may be either current expenses or capital charges. In all of
these situations, what should determine whether the transaction in
question is to be considered when computing the income tax liability
of the taxpayer? With more than one-fifth of the national income be-
ing absorbed by some 175,000 federal, state, and local taxing units,8
the manner in which this problem is solved will appreciably affect not
only the fiscal adequacy of the income tax, but also its effectiveness in
equitably distributing a large part of the national tax burden.
It may be argued that allowance should be made in the tax base
for all payments which contribute to the support of government. Ir-
respective of whether the payment is made directly or indirectly, as
long as the taxpayer is able to demonstrate the extent of his contribu-
tion to the public treasury his taxable income should be reduced by
that amount. In addition to the advantage of avoiding the specious but
prevalent objection to paying a "tax on a tax," this plan has the very
real virtue of disregarding the purely formal distinctions resulting
from the phrasing of a particular tax statute. Both the name given the
exaction and the person upon whom it is technically imposed would be
ignored; its incidence would determine its deductibility.
Another solution would be to treat payments to the various govern-
ments just as any other expenditure. If they represent expenses incident
to the taxpayer's trade or business, those in the nature of a current
expense would be deducted in the year paid or accrued while capital
expenditures would be amortized over the appropriate years-assum-
ing, of course, that the expenditure represents a recoverable capital
charge. To thus limit the .deduction to payments or accruals incurred
in connection with the taxpayer's income producing activities offers a
number of practical advantages. The difficulty of determining the
incidence9 of the tax is obviated; the productivity of the act as a
revenue measure is greatly increased; 10 and the solution conforms with
816 Fortune Magazine (t937) 1o7; Moulton and Others, Capital, Expense, Em-
ployment, and Economic Stability (194o) 271; Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem
('937) 3.
*"This does not mean that it is impossible ever to be reasonably definite regard-
ing the incidence of a particular tax, but it does imply that absolute assurance can
seldom be attained. In this field modesty is a becoming virtue." Haig, Taxation, 14
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1934) 537.
10The deduction of taxes has been the largest of the several deductions permit-
ted individual taxpayers and it has been steadily increasing in amount. Individuals
19411
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the general plan of the statute to ignore, for the purpose of ascertain-
ing net income, the personal expenses of the taxpayer."
The early federal income tax acts apparently accepted, in part, this
second view. The first of such statutes, the Act of 1861, reflected a
reluctance on the part of Congress to enumerate the various expenses
which were to be considered in computing the tax. An unfamiliarity
with the niceties of accurate income assessment and a justifiable fear
that specific allowances would be abused by the taxpayers led to the
policy of merely indicating the sources of income covered by the Act.
The Secretary of the Treasury was expected to work out the method
whereby the amount of such income would be ascertained. However,
to this general plan there was one important exception. The statute
expressly provided that "in estimating said income, all national, state,
or local taxes assessed upon the property, from which the income is
derived, shall be first deducted." 12 The Act of 1862,13 which superseded
the earlier law, and the Act of 186414 contained similar provisions. But
in spite of the careful phrasing of the statute the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue did not limit the deduction to taxes assessed upon
property producing revenue subject to the federal income tax; instead,
both the regulations and the forms failed to distinguish between taxes
paid in connection with the income producing activities of the tax-
payer and taxes which were of a personal nature.15 Congress accepted
this interpretation when the Act was amended in 1865 to permit the
deduction of "all national, state, county, or municipal taxes paid
within the year."16 Broad statements of a similar nature were in-
corporated in the subsequent Civil War statutes17 and the abortive
Act of 1894.18
deducted $541,191,ooo for taxes in 1934 and $838,272,000 in 1937. U. S. Treasury
Department: Statistics of Income for 1934 (1936) 9; U. S. Treasury Department: Sta-
tistics of Income for 1937 (1938) Part x. Under the suggested solution the entire tax
deduction would not, of coure, be eliminated. An important part of the above deduc-
tion represents business taxes. Presumably the much larger deduction of taxes by
corporations ($2,161,892,ooo for 1934; $3,665,565,000 for 1937, Statistics of Income,
supra page 13, Part 2) would not be seriously affected.
"See Int. Rev. Code § 24.
1212 Stat. 292 § 49. Italics supplied.
12 Stat. 432 § 91.
61i3 Stat. 223 § 117.135ee Treasury Regulation, May 1, 1863, reprinted in Estee's Excise Tax Law
(t863) 298, and the form of return reprinted at page 304.
2613 Stat. 469 § 117. Italics supplied.
1714 Stat. 471 (1867) § 117; x6 Stat. 256 (1870) § 9.
28 Stat. 509 (1894) § 32. The Act was declared unconstitutional by Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895); on rehearing 158 U. S.
6o, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895).
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Since the earlier statutes had permitted the deduction of "all"
taxes, Congress, when it enacted the crudely drawn Corporate
Excise Tax Act of 1go9,' a continued this practice. Inasmuch as the
expenditures of corporations falling within the purview of this legisla-
tion were normally those relating to their income, this provision, from
the point of view of accurate income accounting, was far less objection-
able than those which preceded it.20 Unfortunately, with the enact-
ment of the more inclusive income taxes under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment the inaccuracies of the Civil War statutes were repeated when
Congress provided for the deduction of "all national, State, county,
school, and municipal taxes."2'
As a result of this apparent liberality of all the allowance it was
claimed in United States v. WoodwarA22 that, when computing the
taxable income of a decedent's estate, the full amount of the federal
estate tax (in this case an amount in excess of the income for the year)
should be deducted from gross income. Since the exaction had been
designated as a "tax" and since it was imposed by the exertion of the
federal taxing power, the Supreme Court saw no reason for denying
the deduction. The words of the statute were "clear and comprehen-
sive and include[d] every tax."3 The statute provided for the deduc-
tion of "taxes" and "taxes" meant all taxes other than those expressly
excepted. There was no basis for a construction which would limit the
deduction to taxes incurred in earning taxable income; with the ex-
ception of those enumerated,24 all taxes were deductible.
Yet in spite of this broad interpretation of the Act to permit the
deduction of taxes irrespective of their relation to taxable income,
there has been no discernible tendency to construe section 23 (c) in a
manner which would permit those who contributed equally in the
support of government 25 to benefit to the same extent by the allow-
1936 Stat. ii § 38 (2d).
12But even here, the statute failed to distinguish between taxes which represented
current expenses and those representing capital expenditures.
n38 Stat. 166 § II (B). Taxes assessed against local benefits were excluded. Italics
supplied.
1256 U. S. 632, 41 S. Ct. 615 (1921).
0256 U. S. at 6 34, 41 S. Ct. at 6M6.
"The Act of 1918 excluded federal and foreign income, war-profits, and excess-
profits taxes. 40 Stat. 1057, §214 (a) 3.
w'A precise statement of taxes paid is inadequate. A tax burden of an individual
can be measured only after knowing what amount of the taxes that he pays is
,hifted to others, and what amount of the taxes of others is shifted to him. In other
words, the test is taxes borne rather than taxes paid. But- this involves many debat-
able assumptions about the shiftfng of taxes." Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem
(1937) 221.
1941]
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ance. All taxes other than those specifically excluded may be deducted
from gross income, but the taxes deductible are those which have been
technically imposed upon the taxpayer claiming the deduction; i.e.,
he may deduct only his "own" taxes. 26 Although the 19o9 Act per-
mitted corporations to deduct "all sums paid by it within the year for
taxes,"127 it had been previously said that deductible taxes must be the
taxes of the corporation seeking the deduction and not the taxes of
another.2 8 Taxes imposed upon stockholders but collected by the state
from the corporation could not be deducted by the latter;2 9 such
taxes were the stockholders' taxes and deductible only by the stock-
holders.8 0 Subsequent legislation abrogated the effect of these decisions
so far as they relate to corporations, s ' but the general rule established
thereby has continued with increasing vigor. 32 Thus taxes paid gratuit-
,""There can be no doubt but that the clause in the federal statute providing
for the deduction from the gross income of a corporation of 'all sums paid by it
within the year for taxes imposed under the authority of... any state' means taxes
imposed upon it and not upon some other person or corporation. No other reason-
able conclusion could be drawn from the language used." Eliot National Bank v. Gill,
2io F. 955, 936 (D. Mass. 1913). See Grand Hotel Co., 21 B. T. A. 89o, 893 (103o). See
Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation, second series (1938) 24.
"36 Stat. i 1 § 38 (2d).
2E. g. see United States v. Central National Bank, 24 F. 577 (D. N. Y. 1885).
"'National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis v. Allen, 211 F. 743 (E. D. Mo. 1914);
Northern Trust Co. v. McCoach, 215 F. 991 (D. Pa. 1914); Eliot National Bank v.
Gill, 218 F. 6oo (C. C. A. 1st, 1914); First National Bank v. McNeal, 238 F. 559 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1917); Porter v. U. S., 27 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) affirming 2o F. (2d)
935 (D. Ida. 1927); cert. den. 279 U. S. 875, 49 S- Ct. 340 (1929). Where the tax was
construed as being "on" the corporation there was, of course, no objection to the
corporation taking the deduction. Ferguson v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 24 F. (2d)
520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); United States v. Guaranty Trust & Savings Bank, 253 F. 291
(D. Fla. 1918). A. RL R. 2377, I1-1 C. B. 161.
'*National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis v. Allen, 211 F. 743 (E. D. Mo. 1914);
Title Insurance & Trust Co., it B. T. A. 288 (1928); A. W. Hurley, 6 B. T. A. 695
(1927). However, the stockholder was required to include the amount paid in his
gross income. Title Insurance & Trust Co., supra and A. W. Hurley, supra.
n42 Stat. 261 (1921) §§ 214 (a) (3), 234 (a) (3). "The deduction for taxes allowed
by sub-section [23] (c) shall be allowed to a corporation in the case of taxes imposed
upon a shareholder of the corporation upon his interest as shareholder which are
paid by the corporation without reimbursement from the shareholder, but in such
cases no deduction shall be allowed the shareholder for the amount of such taxes."
Int. Rev. Code § 23 (d). There is a similar provision for life insurance companies. Int.
Rev. Code § 203 (5). For an unsuccessful attempt to use § 234 (a) (3) as means of
securing a deduction for a dividend, see Bank of Mt. Hope, 25 B. T. A. 542 (1932).
"Settlor may not deduct transfer taxes. Ardengi v. Helvering, ioo F. (2d) 406
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Beneficiary may not deduct taxes of the trust. Busch v. Com-
missioner, 50 F. (2d) 8oo (C. C. A. 5 th, 1932). Cf. Estate of John Edgar Morrell, 43
B. T. A. No. 9 (1941). Cf. Archibald R. Watson, 42 B. T. A. 52 (194o) where
sole owner of corporation holding title to country estate was permitted to deduct
taxes on estate which he paid. See also Lone Pine Lawn Corporation, 41 B. T. A. 638
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ously for another33 and even those taxes paid pursuant to the terms
of a contract 4 may not be deducted by the person actually making the
payment to the taxing unit; they may be deducted only by the person
who has had his taxes paid.3 5 Furthermore, the incidence of the tax does
not determine its deductibility3 -and this is true even though the
(1940), aff'd 121 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), where personal holding company
owning remainder after intervening life estates was not permitted to deduct taxes
paid by it. But see Joell Company, 41 B. T. A. 825 (1946), where residence was con-
veyed to family corporation on condition that it pay taxes, etc., and lease to grantor
and/or daughter for life for $t per year. The corporation was permitted to deduct
the taxes which it paid. Mary E. Evans, 42 B. T. A. 246 (194o). F. C. Nicodemus, Jr.,
26 B. T. A. 125 (1932) (tenants by the entireties; husband paying tax permitted to
deduct full amount. "Lessees" of cooperative apartments have met with varied suc-
cess. The deduction of an aliquot part was denied in Wood v. Rasquin, 21 F. S. 211
(D. N. Y. 1937), aff'd 97 F. (2d) 1o23 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), and Charles R. Holden, 27
B. T. A. 530 (1933). However, in spite of Congressional refusal to provide for the
deduction of property taxes on corporate cooperatives [Seidman's Legislative His-
tory of Federal Income Tax Laws (1938) 5141 the tax was allowed in Boreland v.
Commissioner, 123 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) where the apartment was in the
name of an individual.
"Colston v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) 867 (Ct. App. D. C. 1932) cert. denied 287 U. S.
640, 53 S. Ct. 89 (1932) (husband paid taxes on wife's property); Robinson v. Com-
missioner 53 F. (2d) 81o (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) (stockholder paid the taxes of a corpora-
tion in which he had a large interest); National Piano Co. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 31o
(CL App. D. C. 1931) (one corporation paid the taxes of another); Burech v. Com-
missioner, 5o F. (2d) 8oo (C. C. A. 5 th, 1931) (trustee gave personal check to pay the
taxes of the trust estate). Sigmund Spitzer, 23 B. T. A. 776 (1931) (former stock-
holder and official paid deficiency assessment against defunct corporation); Beula E.
Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588 (1933) (stockholder paid taxes on corporate property); Eugene
W. Small, 27 B. T. A. 1219 (1933) (husband paid taxes on wife's land); Mrs. Charles
F. Dean, i B. T. A. 27 (1924) (husband paid taxes on wife's property.) See also
Parrott Estate Co. v. McLaughlin, 89 F. (2d) t88 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); Trust No.
5522 and Trust No. 5644, Bellehurst Syndicate, 27 B. T. A. 1250 (1933)-
" Charles R. Holden, 27 B. T. A. 530 (1933); Caroline T. Kissel, 15 B. T. A.
1270 (1929). Although not deductible as a tax, the payment or accrual may be de-
ductible under some other provision of the act. Where a tenant agrees to pay the
taxes on leased property the payment may be allocated to and deductible as rent in
those cases where rent is a business expense. Denholm & McCay Co., 39 B. T. A.
767 (1939); John D. Flackler, 39 B. T. A. 395 (1939); I. T. 2164, C. B. IV - 1, 34. But
where rent is not deductible, taxes paid as rent are not deductible. Charles R.
Holden, supra; Caroline T. Kissel, supra.
25Beula E. Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588 (1933); T. H. Symington & Son, Inc., 35 B. T.
A. 711 (1937). But the amount so paid must ordinarily be included in the gross
income of the person who had his taxes paid. A. W. Hurley, 6 B. T. A. 695 (1927);
Title Insurance & Trust Co., ii B. T. A. 288 (1928). If it is not, the tax is not deduc-
tible. United States v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26o F. 333 (D. Conn. 1919) (1909 Act). Cf.
Commissioner v. Terre Haute Electric Co., Inc., 67 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934)
with Watervliet Paper Co., 16 B. T. A. 604 (1929).
ftIn Shearer v. Commissioner, 48 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), the taxpayer
purchased an automobile and the dealer charged the excise tax as a separate item. In
denying the deduction, Judge Learned Hand said: "In substance ... we must agree
that the only person who has suffered any diminution of what would otherwise have
1941]
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evidence of the "shifting" is reasonably clear8 7 For example, a con-
sumer may deduct a sales tax imposed on him and "collected by" the
retailer,38 but he may not deduct a sales tax imposed on the retailer
and passed on to him.3 9 Because of this implied limitation40 many
taxes are deductible or not according to the fortuitious use of language
by legislative draftsmen.41 If the tax is "on" the dealer, he must include
the total amount received from the sale in his gross income, but he is
permitted to deduct the tax on the sale; 42 if the tax is "on" the custom-
er, the dealer is merely a collecting agent for the state and need not in-
dude the amount so collected in his gross income.43 In both cases the
result, so far as the dealer is concerned, is usually the same; it is the
customer who is in a difficult position. In either case he may bear the
burden of the tax-its economic effect will be little influenced by the
wording of the statute.44
From the point of view of accurate income assessment the legisla-
tive and judicial approval of the earlier administrative extension of the
deduction to include all taxes measurably distorted the tax base. Ac-
countants, while not in agreement as to the theoretical basis for the
been an income, is the customer, and that a nicer accommodation of the tax to
economic burdens would have distinguished between cases in which the tax could be
shown to have been added, and those where the dealer had to bear it. But the final
incidence of taxation is not a measure of the person on whom the tax is levied, and
it seems to us that the form of the statute must control." 48 F. (2d) at 555. See Biddle
v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
'See supra note 36. See also R. C. Musser, 3 B. T. A. 498 (1926); George E.
Hamilton, 6 B. T. A. 240 (1927); Elmira Arms Co., 7 B. T. A. 703 (1927); A. Eisen-
berg, ii B. T. A. 574 (1928); George M. Cohan, ii B. T. A. 743 (928) •
mE. g., see I. T. 2942, XIV - 2 C. B. 94; I. T. 2953, XV - I C. B. 92. See also M.
Rea Gano, 19 B. T. A. 58 (193o); Genevieve Tucker, 2 B. T. A. 796 (1925).
MElsie S. Eckstein, 41 B. T. A. 746 (194o). Mim. 3988, XI - 2 C. B. 25 (1932); 0.
D. 287, 2 C. B. 112 (19o9); I. T. 3382, ig4o - i C. B. 12; I. T. 3378, 1940 - 22 - 10270.
See also, I. T. 35510, 1941-42-1o867.
"°Although the language of the statute does not expressly limit the deduction to
the taxpayer's own taxes, it has been held that this is the necessary implication of
the statute granting the deduction. See Commissioner v. Plestcheeff, ioo F. (2d) 62,
63 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
"Because of the importanace of the deduction the language of the state statutes
is no longer always fortuitous. For example, in Michigan the motor fuel tax act was
amended to permit consumers to deduct the tax. See I. T. 2945, XIV C. B. 296. Since
the Michigan sales tax is not deductible, I. T. 2732, XII - 2 C. B. 45, there is a
movement under way to amend this act. The Michigan use tax of 1937 is deductible
by the consumer. I. T. 3158, 1938 - i C. B. 13o, I. T. 3161, 1938 - i C. B. 116.
12E. g. I. T. 2783, XIII - 1 C. B. 54. See also K. Taylor Distilling Co., Inc., 42 B.
T. A. 7 (1940).
"Since the amount collected is not included in gross income the dealer may not
deduct it as a tax. I. T. 3441, 1941 - 3 - 10564-
"For a discussion of the shifting of the sales tax see Haig and Shoup, The Sales
Tax in the American States (1934) 29 et seq.
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deduction of business taxes,45 are agreed that such taxes must be con-
sidered when determining annual income.48 But taxes which pertain
to the personal expenses of the individual whose income is being com-
puted represent an entirely different type of payment..47 The manner
in which the taxpayer spends his income is his own affair-his taxable
income should not depend, in part, on whether he buys a theatre
ticket and pays an amusement tax thereon 48 or purchases a novel which
may not be subject to an immediate tax. Consequently, for many
years economists have objected to this deduction which fails to dis-
tinguish between business and personal taxes.49 But even if it is as-
sumed that it is desirable to permit the deduction of taxes having no
relation to income in order to escape the objection to paying a tax
"on" a tax, it is apparent that the present deduction falls far short of
this goal.5 0
"Compare Gilman, Accounting Concepts of Profit (1939) 314, 315, with Paton,
Essentials of Accounting (1938) 101, 102. Compare also Canning, Economics of Ac-
countancy (1929) 37, 8.
"Sanders, Cost Accounting for Control (1934) 165; Montgomery, Auditing Theory
and Practice (6th ed. 194o) 251, 298; Lawrence, Cost Accounting (1939) 182; Sanders,
Hatfield and Moore, a Statement of Accounting Principles (1938) 37. However, with
respect to the proper treatment of income taxes there is some dispute. Compare
the "division of profits" concept expressed in Sanders, supra at 165; Lawrence,
supra at 182; Paton, op. cit. supra note 45 at zol; Hatfield, Accounting (1927) 373,
374; Cole, The Fundamentals of Accounting (1920) 291; Seeger, The Nature of
Income Tax (1924) 37 Journal of Accountancy iox, io8, with the "expense" con-
cept expressed in Arisman, Federal and State Income Taxes as an Element of Cost
(1936) 18 Nat. Ass'n. of Cost Accountants Bulletin 385; Hadden v. Commissioner,
49 F. (2d) 7o9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Commissioner v. James, 49 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. sd,
1931; Guarantee Construction Co., 2 B. T. A. 1145, 1150 (1925). Cf. T. D. 2791, T. B.
R. 17, 2 C. B. 294.
'TMontgomery, Income Tax Procedure (1917) 352.
"Such taxes are deductible. M. Rea Gano, 19 B. T. A. 518 (193o).
'"The law permits the deduction for all taxes ... Why this deduction should
be allowed is not clear." Seligman, The Federal Income Tax (1914) 29 Pol. Sci. Q. 1, 9,
io, also in Seligman, The Income Tax (1914) 684.
"Personal taxes, taxes on one's home, and other non-business taxes should not
be deducted any more than any other personal' expense." Plehn, Introduction to
Public Finance (1931) 343, 344- See also Hewett, The Definition of Income and its
Application in Federal Taxation (1925) 22; Groves, Financing Government (1939)
16o, i6i; Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 562, note 3. Cf. King, Public Fin-
ance (1935) 516; Model Income Tax Laws of the National Tax Association, Personal
Income Tax, Article III, § 3o6 (c).
OA comparison of the amounts actually deducted from gross income with the
estimated tax burden borne by the taxpayer emphasizes the inadequacy of § 23 (c).
In 1937 the average deduction varied between 2.96 per cent and 4.21 per cent of
income, U. S. Treasury Department: Statistics of Income for 1937 (1938) 14, where-
as the tax burden of selected family income groups has been estimated to vary be-
tween 8 per cent and iog per cent. See Shoup, Studies in Current Tax Problems
(1937) 32. See also Leonard, the Direct Tax Burden on Low Income Groups (1939) 10.
1941]
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Thus, instead of permitting the deduction of taxes on the basis of
the relation of the tax to income or on the basis of the taxpayer's
actual contribution to the support of government, an intermediate
concept has been adopted. The problem is one of determining the
meaning of "taxes" rather than that of proof of direct and indirect
payment or that of differentiating between current expense on the
one hand and personal expense or capital charges on the other. Con-
sequently, in addition to the inequities resulting from a capricious al-
lowance or disallowance of a payment merely because of its formal
description, this substitution has given rise to a number of difficult
problems which continue to cause unnecessary litigation; it has by no
means simplified the operation of the federal income tax.
A tax has been defined as "a compulsory contribution from the
person to the government to defray the expenses incurred in the com-
mon interest of all, without reference to special benefits conferred."5 1
Three characteristics of a tax may be found in this definition.52 First,
the "contribution" to the government must be compulsory. Second, the
revenue must be used for a common purpose. And third, the exaction
must be made without regard for individual benefit. Many interpreta-
tions of section 23 (c) have been in accord with this definition.
It appears to be well settled that a voluntary payment to the govern-
ment may not be deducted as a tax.53 Thus, gifts and loans dearly do
not fall within this classification and they may not be deducted as
"taxes paid or accrued." 54 Within the same category are payments made
for goods and services purchased from a government unit engaged in
business.55These types of payments and accruals cause little difficulty;
"Seligman, Essays on Taxation (ioth ed. 1925) 482.
"For judical recognition of these characteristics, see, for example, (i) United
States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 S. Ct. 278 (1931); Tevander v. Ruysdall,
299 F. 746 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924), (2) United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 312,
317 (1936); Loan Association v. Topeka, 2o Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874) (McAllister, Pub-
lic Purpose in Taxation (193o) 18 Calif. L. Rev. 137, 241; cf. Buehler, Public Finance
(2d ed. 194o) 654 et seq.), (3) Cornelius v. Kromminga, 179 Ia. 712, 161 N. W. 625
(1917); State v. Wetz, 4o N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835 (igi8). See also, I. T. 3511, 1941-
43-10874.
5See supra notes 26, 28, 33 and 34, where the payment of the tax was "volun-
tary" and therefore non-deductible.
5"In addition to the fact that the word "tax" has lost its earlier donative signific-
ance the Int. Rev. Code § 23 (o) (q) permits the deduction of contributions to federal,
state and local governments in certain cases.
nVoluntary payments in accordance with a contractual agreement made with
a foreign government not deductible as taxes. Amtorg Trading Corporation, 25
B. T. A. 327 (1932) reversed on another point 65 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). Post-
age not a tax. Reg. 86, 94, io, Art. 23 (c)-; Reg. 74, 77, Art. 151; Reg. 65, 69, Art.
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more troublesome questions are presented in those cases where the
taxpayer is under no technical obligation to pay, at the time demanded,
the exact amount claimed as a deduction.
Since, theoretically speaking, it may be argued that a taxpayer is
not compelled to pay an illegal "tax," the Board of Tax Appeals for
a number of years adhered literally to the view expressed in an unre-
lated situation by the Supreme Court in Norton v. Shelby County: "An
unconstitutional act is not law.. it is, in legal contemplation, as in-
operative as. though it had never been passed." 56 Inasmuch as an un-
constitutional tax was void ab initio, it was, therefore, not deducti-
ble.57 Similarly, since a retroactive tax, although valid, could have only
prospective coercive effect, such taxes were not accruable deductions
for the relevant years prior to their enactment.58 Furthermore, the
131; Reg. 45, 62, Art. 131. See Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall.
456 (U. S. 1874). But see Bauer, Rates and Revenues of Public Enterprises (1936) 183
Annals Am. Academy of Pol. Sci. 70; 2 Lyon, Abramson and Associates, Government
and Economic Life (194o) 1129 et seq. Note the treatment of municipal water rates
in Leonard, the Direct Tax Burden on Low Income Groups (1939) 1o; cf. Mahler v.
Commissioner, x19 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
wt18 U. S. 425, 442, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 1125 (1886). Cf. Chicot County Drainage Dis-
trict v. Baxter State Bank, 3o8 U. S. 371, 374, 6o S. Ct. 317, 318 (1940).
5Tayments made under a tax statute later declared unconstitutional not de-
ductible as "taxes" when the amounts paid are subsequently refunded. Mary W.
Leach, 16 B. T. A. 781 (1929), affirmed 5o F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); Lehigh
Valley Coal Sales Co., 15 B. T. A. 1401 (1929); Philip C. Brown, so B. T. A. 1122
(1928). In E. L. Bruce Co., 19 B. T. A. 777 (1930) where the payment was not re-
funded it was held that while the payment could not be deducted as a tax, it
could be deducted as a loss. But where only a part of the statute was held uncon-
stitutional and there was nothing to show that the amount paid would have been
less if the unconstitutional provision had not been enacted, the amount paid as a
tax could be deducted in full. Charles F. Fawsett, 30 B. T. A. 9o8 (1934). See First
National Bank, Stoughton, Wisconsin, 22 B. T. A. 1oo, 1053 (1931). A mere claim
of unconstitutionality does not- affect the question of deductibility. A taxpayer on
an accrual basis must deduct the tax in the year in which it accrues-not in the
year in which its constitutionality is finally established. See Bartles-Scott Oil Co., 2
B. T. A. i6, 18, 9 (1925). Cf. Commissioner v. Terre Haute Electric Co., Inc., 67 F.
(2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) where the related problem of accrued income was con-
sidered. The lessor was required to include in its gross income accrued taxes which
the lessee was required to pay as a part of the rent even though the amount due
was not ascertained until final adjudication.
uUnion Bleachery v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1938); Ed.
Schuster & Co., Inc., v. Williams, 283 F. 115 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922); Norwich & Wor-
cester R. Co. 16 F. (2d) 944 (D. Mass. 1926); Estate of William H. Block, 39 B. T. A.
338 (1939); James Bliss Combs, 17 B. T. A. 279 (1929); Purdy & Henderson Co. 4 B.
T. A. 70 (1926); Jamestown Worsted Mills, 1 B. T. A. 659 (1925). 0. D. 387, 2 C. B.
116; 0. D. 505, 2 C. B. i x6; 0. D. i i8, 5 C. B. 133; McCarthy, When Does a Tax
Accrue? (1924) 37 Journal of Accountancy, 268, 272, 273. The Problem does not
arise where the taxpayer reported on the cash basis; such taxes are deductible in
the year paid. I. T. 1498, 1-2 C. B. 95. Cf. Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282
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courts and the Board adopted similar reasoning in other types of
transactions. Section 23 (c) having been construed to presuppose a
valid exaction, sums demanded and paid to a taxing unit under the
mistaken belief that the taxpayer was subject to the statute in question
have also been held not to be "taxes"- 59 and the same is true of ex-
cessive assessments; to the extent that the amount claimed exceeded
the legally collectible exaction the payment or accrual could not be
deducted as a tax.
6 0
This conceptualistic attitude concerning the nature of a tax ap-
peared to work equally well in reverse. A retroactive statute which re-
duced the taxpayer's liability for an earlier year,61 a refund of a tax
due to a condition subsequent, 62 and the underassessment of a tax- I'
these events in no way affected the "true" amount to be deducted dur-
ing a specific year by a taxpayer on an accrual basis. Just as a taxpayer
who paid less, as the result of a compromise, than the amount required
by statute was permitted to deduct the full amount which he should
have paid,64 so those who ultimately paid less than the legal tax or who
U. S. 375, 51 S. Ct. 144 (1931) where a retroactive increase in rate, made in ample
time for taxpayer to adjust its accounts, was held to require the deduction of the
larger amount in the earlier year. But the rule is not applied if the increase is
made after the return is due. See G. C. M. 22366, 1941-4-10575.
"Inland Products Co. v. Blair, 31 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1929) (amounts paid
as a tax on sweet cider pursuant to Treasury Regulations 44 and 52, later declared
void not deductible; return must be adjusted by excluding the amount refunded).
Cf. Borg & Beck Co., 24 B. T. A. 995, 1oo9 (1931) (correctness of deduction not in-
vestigated since it was paid in good faith and recovery barred refund). See Leach v.
Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); Bergen v. Commissioner, 8o F. (2d)
89 (C. C. A. 4 th. 1935)-
wStimson Inv. Corp. v. United States, 35 F. S. 498 (D. C. Mass. 194o); Lattimore
v. United States, 12 F. S. 895 (Ct. Cl. 1935); Mary W. Leach, 16 B. T. A. 78 (1929);
Bettie Matthews, 21 B. T. A. 96 (193o); 0. D. 741, 3 C. B. 115; I. T. 2o81, 111-2
C. B. 97.
41J. I. Case Co. v. United States, 32 F. S. 754 (Ct. Cl. 194o); I. T. 2827, XIII-2 C.
B. 13o. Cf. U. S. Industrial Alcohol Co., 42 B. T. A. 1323, 1390 (194o). See Ameri-
can Laundry Machinery CO., 32 B. T. A. 793 (1935), where the tax was not deductible
since it was repealed in the year in which it accrued. See also G. C. M. 8218, IX-2
C. B. io6; G. C. M. x6491, XV-i C. B. iog; James Bliss Combs, 17 B. T. A. 279
(1929); Purdy & Henderson CO., 4 B. T. A. 70 (1926).
e2Mim. 3958, XI-2 C. B. 33 (1932). Cf U. S. Industrial Alcohol Co., 4g B. T. A.
1323, 1388 et seq. (1940).
3Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932);
Montgomery v. United States, 23 F. S. 130 (Ct. Cl. 1938); Great Northern Ry. Co., 30
B. T. A. 691 (x934); Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 22 B. T. A. 507 (1931); American Cigar
Co., 21 B. T. A. 464 (1930); Haverty Furniture Co., 20 B. T. A. 644 (1930). See also
Carter, Rice & Co., 38 B. T. A. 687 (1933). Cf. Ruud Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 45
F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930).
'Commissioner v. Central United National Bank, 99 F. (Rd) 568 (C. C. A. 6th,
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paid an inadequate amount and were later required to pay in full had
only one possible amount which could be properly deducted- 6 5 the
actual tax required by law. This rule was followed even though the
taxpayer was ignorant of the statute imposing the liability,6 6 was im-
properly assessed by administrative officials,67 or was litigating or
otherwise disputing its validity.
68
However, the theory that a taxpayer was never compelled to pay
an unconstitutional tax or to pay more than was legally due under
a lawful statute presented a number of difficulties. The presumption of
validity of legislative and administrative action6 9 may have appeared
inconsistent with the attitude that the taxpayer should have known
all along that the tax was excessive. or collected under an unconstitu-
ional statute. Certainly, the element of coercion had been recognized
in similar situations when the taxpayer was attempting to recover such
payments from the taxing authority.70 In addition, the earlier deduc-
tion cases presented circumstances where the tax had been actually
refunded so that the readjustment of the return for the year in ques-
tion imposed no great burden.71 And where there had been a refund
and the government could not reopen the taxpayers' returns because
of lapse of time, the inclusion of the refund in the taxpayers' gross in-
come in the year received did not appear unjust since the over-deduc-
tion in the earlier year permitted the escape of legitimate taxes.72 But
x938). Where the taxpayer is on a cash basis, the amount paid as the result of a
compromise may be deducted as a tax in the year paid if collected under a valid
tax statute. B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930).
=Bartes-Scott Oil Co., 2 B. T. A. 16 (1925); Red Wing Potteries, Inc., 43 B. T.
A. No. i2o (1941).
"Elmhirst v. Diggin, 14 F. S. 782 (D. N. Y. 1936); Armstrong Cork Co. 24 B. T.
A. 1 (1931). See Ruud Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 193o) ex-
plained in Carter, Rice & Co. 28 B. T. A. 687 (1933). See A. R. R. 1153, 1-2 C. B. 92.
wE. g., see Stimson Inv. Co. v. United States, 35 F. S. 498 (D. Mass. 194o).
Hygenic Products Co. v. Commissioner, iii F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o);
Continental Baking Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 119 (Ct. App. D. C. 1935);
Russell-Miller Milling Co. v. Helvering, 69 F. (2d) 393 (Ct. App. D. C. 1934);
Helca Mining Co., 35 B. T. A. 454 (1937).
"E. g., see Cooley, Taxation (4 th ed. 1924) §§ 188, 18q, io1, 1038, 1073, 1192,
x219. See also Stason, Judicial-Review of Tax Errors (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 637.
In general, see Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 123 et seq.
"Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 32 S. Ct. 216,
(1912) (payment of unconstitutional state tax held to be involuntary and recover-
able by the corporation). See Magill and Maguire, Cases on Taxation (3 d ed. 1940)
233 et seq.
"Supra notes 57, 59 and 6o.
7 2Nash v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) cert. den. 3oi U. S.
700, 57 S. Ct. 930 (1937); Victoria Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (1935); Houbigant,
19411
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where there had been no refund and none seemed probable, the dis-
allowance of the full deduction worked a very real hardship; conse-
quently the Board took the position that when a tax had been actually
paid it could be deducted even though it was subsequently declared
unconstitutional-at least where the tax had not been refunded before
the filing of the petition or before the final determination of the tax
liability for the year. 3 But even this latter tentative limitation was
subsequently ignored; the present position of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals in this rapidly changing area of tax law is that where the tax
is paid before it is declared unconstitutional it may be deducted in the
year paid or accrued even though it is subsequently refunded.7 4 If the
tax is accrued but not paid before being declared unconstitutional, the
Board has refused to permit the deduction of the accrual 75 However,
in J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner,78 the Board was re-
versed and the deduction of the accrued tax permitted.
The second characteristic of a tax, that it must be raised for a
public purpose, has also been recognized. The orthodox view, under
American constitutional law, is that a tax, to be valid, must be levied
for a public purpose;7 7 since this has been recognized by the several
taxing authorities in the United States, this aspect of the definition
has caused little difficulty-and even if it had, payments under such
statutes should be treated like other unconstitutional exactions. But
Inc., V' B. T. A. 954 ('934). Similar practice was followed in Elsie S. Eckstein, 4 B. T.
A. 746 (194o) where taxpayer deducted accrued taxes and later paid a smaller amount.
On this general problem see Brown, Treatment for Federal Income Tax Purposes
of Errors in the Deduction of Other Taxes (1937) 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 385; Note (1938)
86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 868, 875 et seq.; Legislation (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 46o. See also
Maguire, Surrey, Traynor, Section 82o of the Revenue Act of 1938 (1939) 48 Yale
L. J. 509, 719.
For conflicting treatment of the refund where the taxpayer received no tax
benefit from the earlier tax payment or accrual, compare Central Loan & Inv. Co.,
39 B. T. A. 98 (1939), and Jamieson Associates, 37 B. T. A. 92 (1938), with Uni-
versal, Inc. v. Commissioner, iog F. (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 7 th, 194o) and I. T. 3390,
1940-28-10325.
"'Carter Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894 (194o). "To state that an unconstitutional
statute should be considered void ab initio may be sound legal metaphysics and
helpful in some circumstances, but, as the Supreme Court itself has said in a recent
decision, it is a broad statement which 'must be taken with qualifications'." 42 B.
T. A. at 898.
7'M. & N. Cigar Manufacturers, Inc., 42 B. T. A. xogi (194o).
75J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 892 (194o); Estate of David Davies, 42
B. T. A. 965 (194o); Eckert Packing Co., 42 B. T. A. woo (194o).
"'121 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 3 d, i94i).
7Supra note 52 (2).
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foreign "taxes"78 which fail to meet the public purpose requirement,
have been excluded from the benefits of this section.
79
Conventional discussions of the meaning of "taxes" frequently
emphasize the motive of the legislature in enacting the so-called rev-
enue measure. Many take the view that statutes enacted primarily for
non-fiscal purposes do not represent an exercise of the taxing power.8 0
Of course, a "tax" which is actually prohibitory in character does not
enter into the present problem. But to the extent that the statute re-
sults in the collection of revenue it would seem dear that the payments
thereunder should be deductible as taxes.81 It is well recognized that
all taxes represent various degrees of regulation82 and this fact has not
prevented the taxpayer from deducting such payments from his gross
income. However, a statute which imposes a fine for misconduct is
excluded from section 23 (c); such exactions are imposed by virtue of
the police power and ordinarily not for the purpose of raising rev-
enue.83 Yet from the practical point of view it is apparent that it is
often impossible to distinguish between sanctions in the form of fines
and those in the form of taxes. A "penalty," for example, may de-
scribe payments exacted for misconduct of either a criminal or non-
criminal nature. Penalties imposed for the non-payment of taxes may
represent a fine for deliberate evasion,8 4 a recovery of the expense in-
"Foreign taxes are deductible under § z (c) in those cases where the taxpayer
does not signify in his return his desire to accept the benefits of § 131, relating to
credit for foreign taxes.
"Thus payments required of the taxpayer to meet reparation payments under
the Dawes plan have been held to be payments to meet a public obligation required
to secure peace and, therefore, for a public purpose. But a charge laid by a religious
organization upon a member of the religious community has been ruled not to be
a tax even though (i) it is spoken of as a tax; (2) legal provision is made for its col-
lection; (3) it is assessed and collected by the taxing authorities; and (4) the payment
is not voluntary. G. C. M. 8933, XI-s C. B. 112.
OSee (1941) 2 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 191, 193, 194.
'For example, tariff duties, occasionally paid, should be deductible as taxes
even though the general purpose and effect of the legislation is to prohibit the im-
portation of the goods.
There are many cases recognizing this principle. See, for example, United
States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214 (1919); McCray v. United States, 195
U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769 (19o4); A Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 51 S. Ct. 195
(1931); Sonzinsky v. United States, 3oo U. S. 5o6, 57 S. Ct. 554 (1937)-
=Quite frequently such receipts are used to defray the cost of administering the
criminal law. Lutz, Public Finance (1936) 294. To the extent that the receipts repre-
sent the cost to the state of the activity controlled (and to the extent that a fine may
be said to be imposed for the criminal's own good) the fine may be considered as
being in the nature of a fee. See infra page 17 et seq.
"See United States v. Mitchell, So3 U. S. 391, 399, 58 S. Ct. 63o, 633 (1938).
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curred in investigating the fraud, 85 the amount of the unpaid tax, 86
or merely a charge for lateness.8 7 However, little effort has been made
to allocate "penalty" payments to the various elements involved in
their exaction. Instead, the practice has been to look only to the name
given the charge and accept this as decisive of the question at hand.
Since some penalties may represent fines88 there has been an in-
clination to treat all penalties as if they were fines.89 But if the statute
dearly separated the penalty from some recognized type of deductible
expenditure a different result was reached.90 Where a statute provided
for the payment of a penalty plus one percent interest for each month's
delay the interest was held to be deductible,91 but where the statute
provided for a penalty with an additional one percent for each month
the amount due remained unpaid the entire sum was treated as a
penalty and the deduction denied.92 The fact that the reason for the
additional payment was the same in both cases seemed to make no
difference-the deductibility of the exaction depended upon the literal
words of the statute requiring its payment. Likewise, in determining
whether the payment is a "tax!' or a "penalty" the customary practice
'See 303 U. S. at 401, 58 S. Ct. at 634; ('939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 647.
'A statute may provide a "penalty" for non-payment of a tax, but make no
provision for the collection of the unpaid tax, e. g., see Connecticut General Statutes
(193o) § 14o3, described as an "Estate Penalty Tax."
87A statute may require the payment of the unpaid tax plus a "penalty" of a
designated percent per annum. See infra note 92.
wFines are not deductible. Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation
(1934) § 25.o4 and cases cited therein, note 21.
9For example, see Helen B. Achelis, 28 B. T. A. 244 (1933); Great Northern
Railway v. Commissioner, 40 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
90If the statute designated the payment as "penalty" it was not deductible. Supra
note 89. See also 0. 926, 1 C. B. 241, 242, revoked by G. C. M. 11358, XII-i C. B. 29.
But if the payment was designated as "interest" it was dedutcible. Penrose v. United
States, 18 F. S. 413 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Harvey M. Toy, 34 B. T. A. 877 (1936); Evans v.
Howard Fire Brick Co., 8 B. T. A. 867 (1927); I. T. 1317, 1-2 C. B. 132.
"United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
92Korsar & Co., 16 B. T. A. 952 (1929). This distinction was based on the analogy
of a similar distinction recognized by the Supreme Court in dealing with a federal
or state claim for penalties and interest on taxes due from a bankrupt. In People
v. Jerswit, 263 U. S. 493, 44 S. Ct. 167 (1924), the New York franchise tax (under
consideration in Korsar & Co.) was payable in advance. Upon nonpayment the
statute imposed a penalty of io percent plus one percent for each month of delay.
Since the bankruptcy act did not permit the recovery of a penalty from the bank-
rupt's estate, the claim for both the io percent and the 1 percent per month was
disallowed. However, the Court did approve the allowance of simple interest on the
unpaid tax. In United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 3o4, 45 S. Ct. 110 (1924) the Court
distinguished the above case on the ground that the i percent was in addition to
the penalty and not x percent interest in addition to the penalty imposed by the
federal statute under consideration.
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has been to decide the question by a reference to the description given
the exaction by the courts in some other connection. Language found
in unrelated decisions has been lifted out of its context and compared
with other isolated language and the deduction allowed
93 or denied 94
according to the fortuitous selection of words made by a judge in dis-
cussing some different or even hypothetical problem.
Interpretations of Section 23 (c) also purport to recognize the
third characteristic of a tax. Generally speaking, fees and special as-
sessments are not deductible-the fee by virtue of statutory interpreta-
tion,95 the special assessment by express statutory provision.96 But as
was the practice with respect to statutes dealing with fines and penal-
ties, there has been a tendency to adopt a mechanistic technique when
dealing with fees and special assessments and to accept blindly the
name given the payment by the local authorities.
Since many fees represent current business expenses they are
deductible as such,9 7 and the question of whether they are also de-
ductible as "taxes paid or accrued" is of academic interest only. But
some expenditures, such as incorporation fees, are capital charges,
while others, such as passport fees, 98 may represent personal expenses;
in either type of payment the taxpayer must usually rely upon section
23 (c) if he is to be successful in securing the deduction. Confronted
on the one side by the rule that fees are not deductible as "taxes" and
on the other side by the principle that all taxes are deductible irrespec-
tive of their relation to income, the judicial and administrative treat-
ment of payments designated as "fees" has not been entirely consistent.
Where the taxpayer makes no attempt to demonstrate the exact
character of the "fee," its deduction is disallowed. 99 But if it is demon-
strated that all of the characteristics of a tax are present, then it will
"Sei B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930).
"Helen B. Achelis, 28 B. T. A. 244 (1933).
WE. g., see I. T. 3468, 1941-16-1o684.
"Int. Rev. code § 23 (c) (4).
OFor example, the cost of hunting and fishing licenses has been ruled not to
be a payment or accrual of a tax and not deductible as such, but it may be deducted
as a business expense if used in the taxpayer's trade or business. I. T. 3166, C. B.
1938-1, 133; I. T. 2999, C. B. XV-2, 139; I. T. 2796, C. B. XIII-2, 48. See also I. T.
156, IV-i C. B. 35.
"I. T. 2156, IV-i C. B. 35.
"In Logan-Gregg Hardware Co., 2 B. T. A. 647, 648 (1925), the Board of Tax
Appeals said that "a fee ... paid ... on account of an increase in capital stock, must
be disposed of on the assumption that the sum paid represented a fee and not a tax.
... The fee is alleged to have been paid for the authorization to increase the capital
stock, a capital transaction, and it is therefore not deductible." In Emerson Electric
Manufacturing Co., 3 B. T. A. 932, 936, the Board, again without discussion, said
1941]
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be treated as such. Thus in Holeproof Hosiery Co. 1°o it was said that
since
"the exaction from the petitioner was in substantial excess of
any special benefits accruing to it; that it bore little, if any, re-
lation to the cost of any service rendered by the State, or to
reasonable compensation for any trouble or expense on the part
of the State on account of the increase in the petitioner's
authorized capital stock; that the receipts of the office of the
secretary of state from this and similar charges greatly exceeded
the portion of the expenses attributable to the performance of
any service to the State in connection with the charges; that the
receipts were used for general State purposes and considerable
revenue was derived in this way; and, in short, that there was a
taking under the guise of taxation. Under such circumstances
we hold that the amount paid was a tax.. and deductible."
In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Burnet,1° 1 however, a curious
proviso was added to the general rule. The Board had held that a
"bonus" paid in order to increase the authorized capital stock of
the taxpayer corporation was a fee and not a tax in spite of the fact
that the factors present in Holeproof Hosiery Co. were present to
an even greater extent in the later case.'0 2 An early state decision,
in passing upon the constitutionality of the local act, had said that it
was not a tax'03 and a federal court had also held that it was not a
tax for the purpose of the National Bankruptcy Act. 0 4 Since a dis-
trict court had followed the bankruptcy decision in applying 23 (c)
to the tax at hand,105 the Board also held that it was not deducti-
that "the fees paid... in connection with the amendment to the taxpayer's charter
in order that it might increase its capitalization, is not a tax, but is a fee, and as
such is deductible only if it falls within the provisions (relating to business expense).
This item is a capital expenditure and not an ordinary and necessary expense."
1w B. T. A. 557, 555 (1928). For subsequent decisions of the Board recognizing
this rule see Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., 11 B. T. A. 1192 (1928); Borg & Beck Co.,
24 B. T. A. 995 (1931); Michigan Central Railroad Co., 28 B. T. A. 437 (1933); Clark
Thread Co., 28 B. T. A. 1128 (1933).
I164 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
20E. g., the sum paid in the Holeproof case amounted to only $i,76o whereas
the payments made in the United Gas Improvement Co. case exceeded $75,ooo. The
payments were placed in the General Fund for the maintenance of the "running
expenses of the government of the State of Pennsylvania." During each year in
question the amounts collected by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania exceeded
$1,500,000. 25 B. T. A. at 1382, 1383.
'Commonwealth v. Erie & Western Transportation Co., 107 Pa. ixg, 115 (1884).
The bonus was said not to be a tax, but "an attempt ... by one of the parties to the
contract to exact an additional consideration and to impose an additional burden
upon the exercise of one of the rights granted in the charter."
'"Commonwealth v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 192 F. 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911).
='Greensburg Coal Co. v. United States, (W. D. Pa. 1929) VIII-2 C. B. 319.
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ble.106 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying
upon its earlier decision relating to the treatment of the "bonus"
as a preferred daim in bankruptcy and upon the state decision as to
its constitutionality, agreed with the Board that the payment was
not a tax. Although both the Board and the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stressed the quid pro quo aspect of the bonus and treated the
payment as if it were the purchase of a right-of-way or some special
privilege, subsequent rulings of the Board have dearly shown that
charges demanded by the state for the privilege of increasing the
authorized stock of a corporation which are exacted for the pur-
pose of revenue and without reference to cost or benefit may be
deducted as taxes.' 07 In view of these later decisions, the United
Gas Improvement Co. case apparently permits the deduction of all
taxes exacted as a condition precedent to the performance of an
act or the exercise of a privilege except those which a state or federal
court has said were not "taxes." A fee or a similarly described charge
may be deducted as a tax if it can be demonstrated that the pay-
ment is essentially a tax, 0 8 or if the fee in question is like some other
fee which has been construed to be essentially a tax;' 09 but if a
court at some time has said that the payment is not a tax, then a tax
it cannot be even though all of the characteristics of a tax are pres-
ent."10
Although a special assessment may be considered as merely another
type of a fee,'" its treatment under the various federal income tax
statutes has been unique. Unlike a fee which may be deducted only if it
u4295 B. T. A. 1.382 (1932).
tmMichigan Central R. Co., 28 B. T. A. 437 (1933); Clark Thread Co., 28 B. T.
A. 1128 (1933).
1wHoleproof Hosiery Co., ii B. T. A. 547 (1928); Borg & Beck Co., 24 B. T. A.
995 (930).
ImMichigan Central R. Co., 28 B. T. A. 327 (1933); Clark Thread CO., 28 B. T. A.
1128 (1933).
2aSee Summerville Tubing Co., 36 B. T. A. 347 (1937).
lu"A special assessment is distinguished from a tax on the grounds that it is
a payment made once and for all to defray the cost of a specific improvement to
property and levied according to the particular benefit accruing to each property
owner. A fee is distinguished from a special assessment on the ground that it is a
recurring charge, and from a tax on the ground that the service financed by it
confers a measurable special advantage to the taxpayer. Some writers (e.g. Plehn,
Carl C., Introduction to Public Finance, 5 th ed. New York 1926, p. 332) recognize
no significant distinction between a fee and a special assessment." Haig, Taxation,
14 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1934) 532. On this last point, see also 2
Fairchild and Others, Elementary Economics (3 d ed. 1936) 9, 1o.
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falls within some other provision of the act,112 a special assessment is,
in many cases, deductible as a tax-and being deductible as a tax, the
expenditure need not meet the business expense requirement. It may
thus seem strange that the courts would be more strict with respect to
an expenditure which was denied as the result of statutory interpreta-
tion113 than one which was expressly prohibited by Congress.114 The
factors which distinguish a fee from a tax apply with at least equal
force to special assessments and the reasons which deny the deduction
of the one unless it is a business expense apply to the other.
The Civil War income tax laws made no mention of special bene-
fits or assessments. 115 Since the payments were compulsory and were
exacted by a government unit they were thought of as taxes and
were deductible as such in the year in which they were paid.116 Con-
sequently, assessments for street grading and similar improvements
were permissible deductions even though the payments were in the
nature of capital expenditures and such permanent improvements
could not ordinarily be deducted as current expenses.117 However,
the impropriety of the allowance was recognized in the Act of 1894
which expressly denied the deduction of "taxes assessed against
local benefits." 118 With the exception of the Corporate Excise Tax Act
of 19o9," 9 a special assessment provision has been included in all
subsequent income tax statutes. 20 In 1918 the disallowance was
"mFees are frequently deductible as a business expense. Supra note 97. Fees paid
as a part of the taxpayer's personal expense are not deductible. I. T. 13oi, I-1 C. B.
133. See also I. T. 3511, 1941-43-1o874.
'"Fees are not mentioned in § 23 (c).
2""In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: ... (c) Taxes
paid or accrued within the taxable year, except-... (4) taxes assessed against local
benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of the property assessed; but this
paragraph shall not exclude the allowance as a deduction of so much of such taxes
as is properly allocable to maintence or interest charges." Int. Rev. Code § 23.
1012 Stat. 292 (1861); 12 Stat. 432 (1862); 13 Stat. 223 (1864); 16 Stat. 256 (1870).
During 1865 an unsucessful attempt was made to amend the tax deduction pro-
vision by adding the words "or assessments."
n-i I. R. R. 196; 3 I. R. R. 88, 204; 5 I. R. R. 1i5; Bump's Federal Internal
Revenue Laws (187o) 291; White, The Federal Income Tax Law (1913) 55. But com-
pare T. D., April 28, 1865 with T. D., April 13, 1867, reprinted in Digest of Internal
Revenue Decisions 1864-1898 (1906) 34, 101.
2mSee 2 I. R. R. 61; 5 1. R. R. 13o; 7 1. R. R. 58, 6o; 11 1. R. R. 50, 73 in Bump,
op. cit. supra note i16.
21'28 Stat. 509 (1894).
mSee 36 Stat. 11, 112, § 38 (2d). Cf. Caldwell Milling Co., 3 B. T. A. 1232, 1233
(1926).
m 38 Stat. 114 (1913) § 11 (B). Although the Act of 1913 did not except special
benefits paid by corporations [see § ii (G.) (b)], Treasury Regulations 33, Art. 153,
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materially modified when nondeductible special benefits were limited
to those "tending to increase the value of the property assessed"'121
and in 1928 it was further restricted by excluding from this pro-
hibition that part of the assessment "properly allocable to main-
tenance and interest charges."'
122
One rationale of the nondeductibility of special benefits is that
such benefits constitute a permanent improvement to the taxpayers'
property and being in the nature of a capital expenditure the total
amount should not be deducted in a single year; if the expenditure
is to be deducted at all it should be amortized over the useful life
of the improvement. Those benefits which are of a temporary character
do not represent capital investments but are in the nature of a cur-
rent expense; having no useful life beyond the year in which the
obligation is incurred, they should be deducted in the year paid or
accrued. In those cases where the special "benefit" does not actually
improve the value of the taxpayers' property it should not, of course,
be treated as a special assessment, but should be treated as any other
compulsory exaction by a taxing authority-that is, it should be
deducted as a tax. From an examination of the statute and its his-
tory it is thus arguable that the prohibition against the deduction
of special benefits was added to the act to prevent the illogical deduc-
tion of expenditures which were not taxes123 but which had been
erroneously treated as such in the administration of the Civil War
acts. 24 A special assessment was not a tax and was not to be deducted
as a tax.125 It is further arguable that the 1918 amendment126 was
denied the deduction. For subsequent treatment of the deduction see 39 Stat. 756
(1916) §§ 5 (a) (3d), 6 (a) (3d), 12 (a) (4th), 12 (b) (4th); 40 Stat. 3o0 (1917) §§ 214 (a)
(3), 234 (a) (3); 42 Stat. 227 (1921) §§ 214 (a) (3), 234 (a) (3), 245 (a) (6); 43 Stat. 253
(1924) § 214 (a) (3), 234 (a) (3); 44 Stat. 9 (1926) §§ 214 (a) (3), 234 (a) (3); 45 Stat.
791 (1928 § 23 (c); 47 Stat. 169 (1932) § 23 (c); 48 Stat. 68o (1934) § 3 (c); 49 Stat. 1648
(1936) § 23 (c); 52 Stat. 447 (1938) § 23 (c). Int. Rev. Code § 23 (c) (4) reprinted supra
note x14.
In4o Stat. 1057 (1918) §§ 214 (a) (3) (c), 234 (a) (3) (c). Cf. Paul and Mertens,
Law of Federal Income Taxation (1934) § 25-24, n. 64.
'"45 Stat. 68o (1928) § 23 (c) (3).
2 Support for this view is found in the fact that, although the 1913 Act did not
expressly deny a deduction for special benefits paid by a corporation, the regula-
tions excluded such payments without the necessity of a statute. See supra note 12o.
u'Supra note 16.
1- But note the use of language in the present act, supra note 114.
"''There shall be allowed as deductions: .. (3) Taxes paid or accrued within
the taxable year imposed ... (c) by the authority of any State... not including
those assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of the
property assessed." 40 Stat. 1057, §§ 214 (a), 234 (a).
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not added for the purpose of permitting the deduction of all special
benefits of a kind which did not tend to increase the value of property,
but was added for the purpose of insuring that such "benefits" would
not be automatically excluded as a deduction. That is, payments may
be in the form of a special assessment when, in fact, the payment may
be either a tax or an ordinary fee. If the payment is actually a tax
or a fee, then the denial of the deduction of "special benefits" was not
intended to cover such exactions; their deductibility would depend
upon the usual rules relating to such payments.'It is also arguable that
the 1928 amendment 127 relating to interest and maintenance charges
did not make such charges deductible in all cases-the purpose again
was merely to prevent the automatic exclusion of such assessments. As
is true of the other types of payments made to government units, there
is nothing in the statute which prohibits an examination of the "bene-
fit" to ascertain its exact character for the purpose of determining the
extent of its deductibility; upon analysis, the payment would be de-
ducted or not as the other provisions of Section -3 should indicate.
In apparent accord with these principles, the early departmental
opinions and rulings provided that assessments paid for local benefits
such as streets, sidewalks, and levees were in the nature of capital ex-
penditures and not deductible in the year paid,1 28 but that assess-
ments for the maintenance and repair of local benefits, as far as such as-
sessments could be allocated to property necessary to the conduct of the
taxpayer's business, could be deducted as a business expense."2 How-
ever, the permanent improvements, although not deductible in full
in the year paid, could be amortized over a period of years and de-
ducted from gross income if they represented a proper business expense
or depreciation charge.180
Unfortunately, the Board of Tax Appeals in one of its early de-
cisions inaugurated a policy of refusing to analyze many types of
special assessments. In Caldwell Milling Co.131 the taxpayer claimed
rThe Act of i98 provided that "the provision relating to the nondeductiblity
of special benefits shall not exclude the deduction of so much of such taxes as is
properly allocable to maintenance and interest charges." 45 Stat. 791, § 23 (c).
mI. T. 1246, I-1 C. B. 135; I. T. 1653, II-1 C. B. 121; I. T. 2164, IV-' C. B. 34.
Belfast Investment Co., 17 B. T. A.21 3 (1929); F. A. Smith, ii B. T. A. 3o (1928).
ImG. C. M. 821, V-2 C. B. 38; Reg. 45 (192o ed.), Art. 133; Reg. 62, Art. 133; Reg.
65, Art. 133; Reg. 69, Art. 133.
1mG. C. M. 5589, VIII-i C. B. 83. See I. T. 2164, IV-1 C. B. 34- See also 0. D.
373, 2 C. B. 123, revoked by I. T. 2462, VIII-i C. B. 253, on the recommendation of
G. C. M. 5866, VIII-i C. B. 2oo. See also, letter of D. H. Blair, Commissioner, re-
printed in Prentice-Hall, i94o Federal Tax Service, Par. 13,200.
2n3 B. T. A. 1232 (x926). See also Belfast Investment Co., 17 B. T. A. 213 (1929).
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that since the 1918 Act expressly denied the deduction, as a tax, of
amounts "assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase
the value of the property assessed," 132 he should be permitted to
deduct as a tax an amount paid in discharge of an assessment which
allegedly did not increase the value of his property. The Board, rely-
ing upon the statement found in Norwood v. Baker 33 that an "exac-
tion from the owner of private property of the cost of a public im-
provement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him
is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of
private property for public use without compensation," noted that
this principle was recognized by the jurisdiction in which the assess-
ment had been made; since the taxpayer's claim for the deduction
would not have been necessary if the assessment had been contested in
the proper forum (assuming the contention well-founded), the Board
concluded that the company should not be permitted to obtain a de-
duction through an inquiry striking at the constitutionality of the local
statute. 3 4 In thus refusing to permit the deduction of the full amount
in the year paid or accrued the Board, of course, merely prevented the
taxpayer from distorting his taxable income for the year; the "tax"
was a non-recurrent variety and this particular exaction would not be
repeated during the life of the "improvement." It should, therefore,
have been deferred and an aliquot part deducted each year-just as
any special assessment. But in F. M. Hubbell Son & Co. 3 5 the Board
refused to permit the tax-free recovery of "nondeductible" special
benefits. The corporation had duly capitalized the curbs, sidewalks,
and sewers adjacent to its property for which it had been required to
pay a special assessment and this amount had been taken into con-
sideration when computing its annual depredation. The Board recog-
nized that the action of the corporation was consistent with good ac-
counting practice and that, for the purpose of determining capital
gain or loss, this capitalization was proper.38 However, with respect
to depredation the Board refused to treat the improvement as a de-
preciable asset. The deduction for depreciation was limited to property
in which the taxpayer had a capital investment; since the corporation
made no direct income use of the property, the earlier rulings of the
Commissioner were disapproved and the deduction for depreciation
mSupra note 126.
2=i172 U. S. 269, 278, 279, 19 S. Ct. 187, 195 (1898).
'See the discussion in 3 B. T. A. at 1236.
=19 B. T. A. 612 (193o).
1 1 'Champion Paper Co., 1o B. T. A. 433 (1928).
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on special assessments denied. With the approval of the Board's ac-
tion by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 13 7 the present authority is to
the effect that special assessments for permanent improvements may
not be deducted in the year paid or accrued-and this is consistent
with sound accounting practice. Furthermore, there are statements
to the effect that such improvements may be added to the basis of
the assets benefited for the purpose of ascertaining capital gain or
loss.'88 But it has been expressly held that the decline in value of
business property may not be fully recovered if part of the value is
due to a special benefit.'3 9
Just as assessments for permanent improvements do not represent
the payment of "taxes," so assessments for the maintenance140 of such
improvements do not represent the payment of "taxes." Maintenance
assessments more nearly resemble current expenditures than capital
investments and they should be deducted in the year paid or ac-
crued; but being in the nature of an expense which is not a tax, the
deduction should be allowed only if it is incurred in connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business-and as has been indicated, the
early regulations accepted this view. Furthermore, the 1928 amend-
ment' 4' which excluded from special assessments amounts "allocable
to maintenance and interest charges" does not require a construction
which results in an affirmative authorization of the deduction of all
such charges. It may be argued that the purpose of Congress was not
to permit the deduction in all cases; it was merely to state that the
deduction was not to be denied in all cases-whenever the assessment
constituted an ordinary business expense it was deductible. However,
subsequent regulations have not interpreted Section 23 (c) (4) in
2EIThe decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was sustained in F. M. Hubbell Son
& Co. v. Burnet, 51 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 8th, ig3i), cert. den. 284 U. S. 664, 52 S. Ct.
41 (1931). See G. C. M. 9461, X-i C. B. 120. See also G. C. M. ii33o, XI-2 C. B. 247,
and I. T. 2667, XI-2 C. B. 248, revoking 0. B. 613, 3 C. B. 149.
mNational Lumber & Tie Co. v. Commissioner, go F. (2d) 216 (C. C. A. 8th
1937); F. M. Hubbell Son & Co., 19 B. T. A. 6i2 (193o); Champion Paper Co., 1o
B_ T_ A- 433 (1928)_
INF. M. Hubbell Son & Co. v. Burnet, 51 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931). Cf.
Clinton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1935); Hel-
vering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252, 6o S. Ct. 209 (1939).
10In this connection it is necessary to distinguish between improvements and
maintenance. Thus, where a street was resurfaced with the granite blocks of the old
surface, but over a new concrete foundation, the assessment was not for mainten-
ance, but for a permanent improvement since the effect was to provide practically
a new pavement. I. T. x246, I-i C. B. 135.
U"45 Stat. 68o, § 23 (c) (3).
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this manner. All assessments against local benefits made for the pur-
pose of maintenance or repair are deductible.
142
The same liberality of treatment was not at first accorded assess-
ments for the purpose of paying interest on improvement district
obligations. As is true of maintenance assessments, assessments to
meet interest charges do not involve the payment or accrual of taxes-
when made in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business such
payments resemble legitimate business expenses and should, in such
cases, be deductible. But in spite of this very real similarity between
interest and maintenance assessments, the Income Tax Unit in 1924
ruled that that part of a special assessment which was collected for
the purpose of paying interest on improvement district bonds could
not be deducted-the bonds were not the obligation of the taxpayer
and he was not paying interest on his own debt. 48 Four years later
the Board of Tax Appeals, in F. A. Smith,144 reached the same con-
clusion. However, when the taxpayer sought to deduct the payment
as a tax rather than interest he was more successful. In Andrew
Little 45 the Board dung to its position that the assessment could
not be deducted as interest, but since the taxpayer had also claimed
the deduction as a tax his contention was sustained. Arising before,
but not decided until after Congress had expressly provided that the
prohibition against the deduction of special benefit should not in-
dude amounts "allocable to maintenance and interest charges," the
Board was of the opinion that the 1928 Act made no change in the
existing law and that such "taxes" were properly deductible under
the earlier acts. F. A. Smith was distinguished on the ground that
the petitioner had not separated the interest from the rest of the
assessment and that he had not "raised the specific issue as to whether
tm Reg. ios, Sec. 1g.23c-(3). However, the validity of this regulation may be
questioned. In Lee Wilson & Co., 25 B. T. A. 840 (1932) the taxpayer was permitted
to deduct an assessment for maintenance as business expense. The deduction was
allowed in Chapman & Dewey Lumber Co., 25 B. T. A. 166 (1932), on the authority
of Lee Wilson & Co. Neither case is authority for the position taken in the regula-
tions that all such assessments are deductible since the payments in both decisions
were clearly connected with the taxpayer's trade or business and arose under the
Acts of 1921, 1924 and 1926. See Lizzie H. Glide, 27 B. T. A. 911, 915 (1920), where it
was said that the 1928 provision was "explanatory" rather than "amendatory."
I. T. 2o44, MI-2 C. B. 98.
2"11 B. T. A. 3o (1928). In Claud Nichols Comstock, 15 B. T. A. 769 (1929), the
deduction was again denied. But interest on overdue assessments was deductible.
Evens & Howard Fire Brick Co., 8 B. T. A. 867 (1927).
52i B. T. A. 911 (193o).
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an assessment for interest on the district's bonds constituted a tax of
a kind tending to increase the value of the property assessed." 146
The failure to examine the character of assessments for perman-
ent "improvements" (which had not been repeated in those decisions
dealing with interest and maintenance assessments) continued to
cause difficulty in those cases where assessments were made for tempor-
ary improvements. In Oscar Michell' 47 the taxpayer was assessed by
the City of Duluth for sprinkling the street in front of his residential
property. The assessment was made pursuant to a provision in the city
charter authorizing the city council to "order the construction of any
sidewalk or sewer, or the sprinkling of any highway... and may cause
the cost of such construction or sprinkling... to be assessed against
the property specially benefited." The assessment was disallowed by
the Commissioner on the ground that it was a special benefit, but the
Board held it to be deductible as a tax on the ground that the sprink-
ling of a street "was not an improvement intended to increase the
value" of the taxpayer's property and that it was a tax levied to pay
"one of the incidental expenses that are incurred by the municipality
for the public interest."' 48 In reaching this conclusion, however, the
Board failed to realize that the purpose of compulsory "improvement"
to a taxpayer's property is to bring about a public benefit. 49 The
sprinkling of the street was an advantage to the public and the prop-
erty-owner just as the paving of the same street would result in both
a special and a general benefit-but the fact that a street pavement also
benefited the public has not been a basis for treating a special assess-
ment therefor as a tax. Sprinkling the street resulted in a temporary
benefit to the property assessed and it should have been so recognized.
The amount paid or accrued should not be deducted as a tax; if the
1U21 B. T. A. at 915. Claud Nichols Comstock, 15 B. T. A. 769 (1929) was ex-
plained by saying that there "the only issue was whether the assessment for interest
on drainage district bonds could be deducted by the taxpayer as interest paid, and
that decision is followed in the case at bar." For later decisions, see Lee Wilson &
Co., 25 B. T. A. 840 (1932); Chapman & Dewey Lumber Co., 25 B. T. A. 1166 (1932);
Lizzie H. Glide, 27 B. T. A. 1264 (1933).
'"27 B. T. A. to (1932).
1"27 B. T. A. at 1o5.
ul"Suppose that the city authorities decide to pave a certain street. There will
generally result a material advantage to the owners of land fronting that street on
the account of the rise in the value of such land.... The city government under-
takes a new street pavement, not from any desire to benefit particularly the owners
of the land, but because the interests of all the people of the city will be promoted
by a better surface on that street." 2 Fairchild and Others, Elementary Economics
(1936) 9. io.
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property benefited was used in the taxpayer's trade or business the as-
sessment should be deducted as a business expense, but if the property
was used as his private residence the assessment was nothing more than
a personal expense and it should not have been deducted from his
gross income. Thus the result reached by the Board may be justified
if the assessment involved business property, but the analysis may be
criticized. Where the Board treated an assessment for interest as a tax
the result reached in the specific case was probably correct since in-
terest payments, like taxes, may be deducted even though not connect-
ed with the taxpayer's income producing activities.150 This is not true
of ordinary expenses. Maintenance charges, regardless of whether they
are for repairs or for some temporary betterment, may not be deducted
from gross income unless they are a business expense.
While it is often difficult to discover the character of an exaction
described as a "tax," a "fine," a "penalty," or a "special assessment," it
seems apparent that, in cases of importance at least, there should be
no objection to a litigant demonstrating the inaptness of the descrip-
tion. Thus in determining whether a penalty in question is a fine, a
fee, an interest charge, or the collection of a back tax, the circum-
stances pertinent to the solution of this problem should be considered
instead of arbitrarily denying the deduction merely because it is given
the name "penalty." The Supreme Court has recently pointed out that
the name given the "tax" or "penalty" is not conclusive; 15' the legal
effect of the payment is determined by its purpose and not its descrip-
tion. Furthermore, the nondeductibility of a penalty has been seriously
questioned. The recent practice has been to consider the reason for
imposing the penalty claimed as a deduction. Suggestions are to be
found to the effect that a penalty may be deducted as a business expense
if the evidence is clear that the penalty is imposed because of neg-
ligence rather than because of fraud. 5 2 This practice could be carried
to a degree consistent with a reasonably certain allocation of penalty
payments to the various purposes served by the exaction. To the extent
that the penalty represented a fine it would be treated as such and the
2'"In computing net income there shall be allowed as a deduction: ... (b) All
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness..." Int. Rev. Code
§ 23 (b)-.
ImUnited State v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 55 S. Ct. 223 (1935).
=See United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). There is a his-
torical basis for the deduction of both fines and penalties. See T. D., July 27, 1866,
reprinted in Digest of Internal Revenue Decisions 1864-1898 (i9o6), (fines and penal-
ties imposed for violating excise laws deductible from the profits of the business for
which they were incurred, but not from the income from other pursuits).
1941]
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payment disallowed; but that part of the penalty imposed for lateness
or which represented the unpaid tax would be treated in the same
manner as all interest payments and back taxes. In those cases where
the statute makes no provision for the payment of interest on past due
taxes, but merely imposes a penalty, some part of the penalty should
be considered as interest. Similarly, where the statute does not pro-
vide for the collection of the unpaid tax, but merely imposes a large
penalty, it would appear that that part of the payment equal to the
unpaid tax could properly be considered a deductible tax within the
meaning of 23 (c). And finally, if it is possible to allocate any part of
the penalty to the cost of discovering the non-payment of the tax, that
part so allocated should be treated as a fee and deducted only in those
cases where similar fees may be deducted.
This same care should be exercised in determining the deductibil-
ity of a fine since a fine also has the double disadvantage of being ex-
cluded as a business expense as well as a tax. It sometimes happens that
fines are imposed for the purpose of raising revenue-traffic violations
offer ample opportunity for this practice.15s If it is dearly shown that
the purpose of the "fine" was to raise revenue and not to impose
punishment, it is arguable that such payments should be deducted
as taxes.
When the Treasury Department and the Board of Tax Appeals
are left free to determine the nature of a payment designated as a fee
the results conform to the orthodox concept of a tax; but when a state
or federal court has first passed upon the nature of the exaction (even
though the decision has no direct bearing on the problem at hand)
the problem of analysis is forgotten and the letter of an irrelevant
opinion taken as decisive.154 The Supreme Court has clearly indicated
that a state decision may not be used as a basis for reaching a result
contrary to the intention of Congress.155 Where fees are collected for
some special privilege and the amounts do not materially exceed the
cost to the government, the payments are usually classified as fees and
the deductions denied. But it is not to be supposed that the states
could change this result by merely tagging the fees with the official
InSee Lutz, Public Finance (1936) 294.
15See the discussion in Clark Thread Co., 28 B. T. A. 1128, 1152, 1153 (1933),
where this different treatment was recognized by the Board. CL G. C. M. 597a, V-2
C. B. 168; I. T. 2570, X-1 C. B. 115; Mim. 4595, 1937-1 C. B. 63.
10E. g., see Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 74 (1932); Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U. S. 188, 59 S. Ct. 155 (1938); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 626, 60 S. Ct.
424 (1940); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659 (1941).
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title of "taxes." Neither dicta nor decisions will bring the fee within the
tax deduction provision when the purpose is to deprive the federal
government of revenue. If random remarks and even express holdings
will not be permitted to justify the deduction as a tax those payments
which are not taxes, then similar statements should not be used to
deny the deduction of payments which are actually taxes but which
are not so described. 15 6
This same approach should be taken in determining the deducti-
bility of payments made to secure licenses. Such payments may repre-
sent merely the cost to the state of issuing the license or the cost of
regulating the business subject thereto-in which event the payment
should be treated as a fee. However, many licenses are required merely
for the purpose of raising revenue and they should be treated as any
other tax.157 Where the charge is a combination of the two, the com-
bination tax-fee payment should be allocated to its proper category
whenever the available information is sufficient to warrant the prora-
tion. 58
The inclusion of the special benefit provisions in the tax deduc-
tion section has led to considerable. difficulty and confusion. The fail-
ure to recognize that special assessments are not "taxes" has given
rise to the doctrine that all special assessments, except those dearly
excluded by the statute, may be deducted as taxes. The result of this
unfortunate association has been a tendency to exclude for most pur-
poses those special assessments which were specifically declared not to
be taxes; on the other extreme there has been a tendency to permit
the deduction of all special benefits which were not specifically ex-
cluded as taxes. Irrespective of whether the payment represented a
capital charge or personal expense there has been a refusal to examine
the character of the exaction in order to determine its deductibility.
,Furthermore, it has been suggested that a charge for a special bene-
fit, even though it contributes nothing to the general support of the
taxing authority, may be deducted as a tax if the local assessment is
so framed that the property subject to the exaction is not the same as
the property benefited; an improvement assessed against the real prop-
erty benefited would not be deductible, but the same improvement
'"See, for example, the remarks of Magruder, Circuit Judge, concerning the
effect to be given to the characterization of a tax by a state court in George S. Col-
ton Elastic Webb Co. v. United States, i6 F. (2d) 202, 204 (C. C. A. ist, 1940).
=TSee Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B. T. A. 547, 554 (1928).
I'The burden should be on the taxpayer to satisfactorily demonstrate the
validity of his allocation. Cf. Sprague-Sells Corp., So B. T. A. 1165 (1934).
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assessed against the personal property of the taxpayer could be de-
ducted from his gross income.159
As a result of the failure to analyze the nature of the various exac-
tions labeled as "special assessments," the rulings lead to the con-
dusion that all special assessments for temporary improvements, for
maintenance, for interest, and even for permanent improvements-
if the charge is not technically assessed against the property benefited-
may be deducted as "taxes paid or accrued."'1° If the amount in ques-
tion is in the nature of an ordinary special assessment which represents
a permanent improvement, then the payment is not deductible either
as a tax in the year paid or accrued or as depreciation over the life of
the improvement. Even though studies of special assessments have
shown that in some cases the property subject to the assessment has
been actually injured rather than improved,161 a payment described
as a special assessment will nevertheless be treated as a benefit and the
deduction denied. A taxpayer who has been forced to expend a large
sum of money in payment of a non-beneficial improvement has con-
tributed just as much to the public revenues as the person who paid
the same amount in ordinary local taxes-the fact that the payment
is earmarked for a particular purpose should make no difference. If
the taxpayer is able to show that the benefit received is substantially
less than the amount of the assessment he should be permitted to
deduct the assessment; 16 but as is true of assessments for mainten-
ance, the burden should be upon the taxpayer "to show the allocation
of the amounts assessed to the different purposes." If this cannot be
done, none of the amount so paid should be deductible as a tax.
If the deduction is not to become even more capricious than the
language of section 23 (c) requires,163 it is imperative that an effort
''in G. C. M. 821, V-2 C. B. 38, it was said that Mississippi levee district "taxes"
assessed against real property were not deductible, but that "taxes" of the same dis-
trict assessed against personal property were deductible.
2Compare the accounting treatment of such assessments. Paton, Essentials of
Accounting (1938) 3o2.
aIn general, see Hahne, Special Assessments and Licenses (1!36) 183 Annals Am_
Academy Pol. Sci. 13o; Hahne, Special Assessments, in 14 Encyclopaedia of the
Social Sciences 276, 277, 278; Spengler, The Increment Tax Versus Special Assess-
ments (1935) 21 Nat. Tax Ass'n. Bulletin 14. See also Simpson, Changing Theory
of Property Taxation, (1939) 29 Am. Econ. Rev. 453, 465; Graham, Special Assess-
ments in Detroit (193o) 21, 22; Burnstan, Special Assessment Procedure (1929) 84, 91.
'See National Lumber & Tie Co. v. Commissioner, go F. (2d) zi6( C. C. A. 8th,
1937) where the taxpayer successfully sustained his contention that he should be
permitted to show, for the purpose of computing the loss on the sale of assets, what
part, if any, of the Louisiana levee taxes were assessed against local benefits.
m Cf. Helvering v. Queen Ins. Co., sx5 F. (2d) 341, 342 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o).
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be made to permit the allowance of payments falling within the
orthodox definition of a tax. At best the implied limitation which
prohibits the taxpayer from deducting those taxes not technically
imposed upon him but which he indirectly pays causes a great amount
of unfairness. It is difficult to comprehend the desirability of a deduc-
tion which depends so much upon the methods adopted by the several
states to raise local revenue. To accentuate this disparity of treatment
by refusing to examine payments which, if analyzed, would clearly fall
within the provisions of the present statute is far less understandable.
Yet even if care is exercised and formal considerations ignored, the
existing deduction of taxes is highly unsatisfactory. To amend the
statute to permit the deduction of all taxes actually borne by the tax-
payer-whether imposed directly upon him or not-is, of course, in-
feasible. 64 Aside from the administrative problems involved, the loss
of revenue resulting from the larger allowance prohibits this attempt
during a period of tremendous national deficits. Consequently, in
order to remove the unfairness of section 23 (c), an amendment which
would deny the deduction of any tax other than a tax incurred in the
taxpayer's trade, business, or profession appears desirable. 165 The
accounting problems appear much less formidable than those created
by the pseudo-economic conceptualism of the present law.
To a limited extent Congress has recognized the impropriety of the
broad tax deduction of the Civil War statutes.168 Because of the ir-
relevance of the exaction in computing annual income 87 and because
of the difficulty involved in determining the taxpayer entitled to the
deduction, estate, inheritance, legacy, succession, and gift taxes were
finally removed from the list of deductible taxes.' 8 The deduction of
'"For some of the difficulties involved in attempting to estimate this burden see
Haig and Shoup, The Sales Tac in the United States (1934) 29 et seq.
u"This was seriously urged during the early operation of the present income tax
statute. Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (1917) 352. See also Seligman, The In-
come Tax (1914) 684; Plehn, Introduction to Public Finance (1931) 24", 244. For a
more recent criticism see Paul, The Emergency Job of Federal Taxation (1941) 27
Corn. L. Q. 3, ig.
'w"In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in re-
spect of-(5) Any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to
one or more classes of income other than interest (whether or not any amount of
income of that class or classes is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the taxes
imposed by this chapter." Int. Rev. Code § 24. Pursuant to this provision and
Treasury Regulations 1o3, § 19.24 -4 ,it has been ruled that a state income tax paid
on the exempt compensation of state employees is not deductible from gross income.
I. T. 3353, 194o-1 C. B. 44.
=See the Committee Reports reprinted in 1939-I (Part 2) C. B. 57 o , 6o5.
'Int. Rev. Code § 23 (c) (3). In general, see Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal
Income Taxation (1934) §§ 25.50, 25.51, 25.52, 25-53. 25.54, 25.55-
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federal income, war-profits, and excess-profits taxes was denied be-
cause of the adverse effect of the deduction upon the productivity of
the income tax-a loss of revenue which the national government
could not afford during the first World War. 6 9 In addition, citizens
of the United States residing abroad may not deduct the foreign tax
on income from sources within the United States which is not subject
to the federal income tax, or taxes "properly allocable or chargeable
against amounts excluded from gross income" because earned outside
the United States.170 Nonresident alien individuals may deduct only
those taxes connected with income from sources within the United
States- 17' the tax may be either foreign or local, but it must be related
to the income subject to the federal tax. 72 Nonresident citizens of
possessions of the United States who are not citizens of the United
States are treated, in this respect, like nonresident aliens. 18 No taxes
may be deducted by nonresident foreign corporations, 174 but such
resident corporations may deduct, as in the case of nonresident alien
individuals, only those taxes connected with income from sources
within the United States. 75
If the exception should be made the rule and taxes treated as
any other expenditure and the deduction permitted only if a business
expense, one of the glaring inequalities of the present legislation would
be corrected. Taxes relating to the individual's personal expenditures
would not be allowed-regardless of whether the exaction was tech-
nically imposed upon him or passed along in the form of higher prices;
111939-1 (Part 2) C. B. 67. The deduction of the federal income tax has met with
varied treatment. For example, the deduction was denied in the Act of 1864 (15 Stat.
223). The Acts of 1870 (16 Stat. 256), 1894 (28 Stat. 509), 1909 (36 Stat. 11),
1913 (38 Stat. 114), and 1916 (39 Stat. 756) permitted the deduction. With the Act of
1917 (40 Stat. 3oi), all subsequent income tax statutes have prohibited the deduction.
In United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498, 57 S. Ct. 309 (1937), the Supreme Court
held that the tax on transfers of interests in silver bullion was an income tax. This
caused a revocation of I. T. 2899, C. B. XIV-i, 67, which permitted the deduction
from gross income, by I. T. 3o49, C. B. 1937-1, 139. The latter ruling was revoked
and the deduction again permitted on the ground that the tax on silver was a
"special income tax" and not of the same "general" character as the "Federal in-
come tax" referred to in § 23 (c) i. Mim. 4587, C. B. 1937-1, 74.
1TInt. Rev. Code § 116 (a). Hubbard v. United States, 17 F. S. 93 (Ct. Cl. 1936).
1If the non-resident alien individual receives an amount of $23,ooo or less from
sources within the United States, no deduction for taxes is permitted. Int. Rev. Code
§§ 211 (a) (i) (A), 211 (a) (2). For treatment of residents of contiguous countries sub-
ject to special treaty provisions see § 211 (a) (3).
luInt. Rev. Code § 213. Waldorf Astor, 31 B. T. A. oo9 (1935).
lnInt. Rev. Code § 252.
11'Int. Rev. Code § 231 (a). Treas. Reg. 1o, Art 232-1.
luInt. Rev. Code § 231 (b) (c) 232.
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but business taxes would be deductible in either event- both direct
and indirect taxes would be included in the cost of operations. Thus
subtracted from total revenues if a business tax and ignored if a per-
sonal tax, the local tax policy of the states would no longer be of such
paramount importance; a person in one state who paid directly a cer-
tain amount for the support of local government would have no
income tax advantage over a person in another state who paid the
same amount in indirect taxes.
176
That persons with the same income and the same exemptions
should pay the same tax is not only a theoretical ideal-the present
income tax rates make it a practical necessity. And even more import-
ant during this period of emergency, the removal of that part of the
deduction which places a disproportionate burden upon a part of
the public will result in an appreciable increase in the national
revenue. It is difficult to believe that there can be a valid objection
to a revision of Section 23 (c) which increases both the productivity
of the federal income tax and the accuracy with which it apportions
the national fiscal burden.
'"Cf. Note (941) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 255.
1941]
